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ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: 
GEOENGINEERING AS A CHALLENGE TO 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
David A. Wirth* 
Abstract: The challenge of global climate change has attracted recom-
mendations for remediation from a number of professions, including en-
gineering. The possibilities suggested for “geoengineering” the climate 
generally fall into one of two categories: (1) removing gaseous carbon di-
oxide from the air and storing it in long-term repositories (“carbon diox-
ide removal”); and (2) limiting or reducing the intensity of incoming 
electromagnetic waves from the sun (“solar radiation management”). 
Specific and often controversial proposals include the aerial dispersion of 
aerosols, launching reflective gratings into orbit around the Earth, and 
seeding the oceans with iron filings. These proposals share the following 
characteristics: (1) they can be undertaken within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of a single state or in areas beyond national jurisdiction; (2) they are 
likely to, and are intended to, have extrajurisdictional—indeed, global— 
effects; and (3) they are largely unregulated at the international level. 
This Essay examines the existing international governance structures to 
address geoengineering and concludes that they are inadequate to the 
task. After reviewing those modest international measures that have been 
adopted to regulate climate geoengineering proposals, the Essay makes 
recommendations for structural adaptations in international governance 
to address the problem of climate change. 
Introduction 
 From the point of view of environmental professionals, climate 
change, the warming of the planet caused by rising levels of heat-
trapping greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) accumulating in the Earth’s at-
mosphere, seems to offer something for everyone. Not surprisingly, 
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training and specialization affect the perspective from which those from 
different disciplines approach the challenges of global warming. Differ-
ing skill sets and mission orientations inevitably find expression in vary-
ing approaches to the task. Scientists offer predictions of temperature 
increases for varying emissions scenarios, and attempt to anticipate the 
scope and magnitude of effects such as sea level rise and loss of biodi-
versity.1 Lawyers write legislation, draft international instruments, and 
litigate with the aim of enforcing compliance with environmental re-
quirements. Economists debate the relative merits of carbon taxes versus 
cap-and-trade proposals, and quibble over discount rates.2 
 As indicated by the dictionary definition of “engineering,” that 
discipline can be expected to bring to the issue of climate change a 
predisposition toward the practical, real-world “application of science 
and mathematics by which the properties of matter and the sources of 
energy in nature are made useful to people.”3 In other words, engi-
neers build things. This propensity to look at the world as fertile 
ground for improving on nature has led to “geoengineering” proposals 
intended to respond to the problem of climate change through physi-
cal interventions in the biosphere. Geoengineering proposals are not 
intended to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases or facilitate adapta-
tion to the inevitable increase in global temperature, but instead aim at 
removing carbon from the atmosphere, preventing solar radiation from 
reaching the Earth’s surface, and implementing other mechanical and 
chemical interventions in the global ecosystem to offset or prevent 
global temperature rise.4 
 Although apparently novel in intent and design, geoengineering 
proposals that target the effects of climate disruption have much in 
common with other engineering projects, at least at first blush. From an 
international law perspective, climate engineering interventions can be 
analyzed, at least in part, using existing analytical approaches. Accord-
ingly, this Essay first identifies a representative sample of geoengineering 
                                                                                                                      
1 See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: 
The Physical Science Basis, 387–88 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http:// 
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4_wg1_full_report.pdf.  
2 E.g., Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review 
(2010). But see William Nordhaus, Critical Assumptions in the Stern Review on Climate Change, 
317 Sci. Mag. 201 (2007) (criticizing the Stern Review).  
3 Engineering, Merriam Webster Online Dictionary and Thesaurus, http://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/engineering (last visited May 1, 2013). 
4 See David W. Keith, Geoengineering the Climate: History and Prospect, 25 Ann. Rev. Energy 
& Env’t 245, 247 (2000). 
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schemes.5 In Part II, the Essay characterizes those proposals from an 
international legal and structural point of view.6 Potential multilateral 
settings for coordinated international action are examined, and those 
multilateral instruments that have been adopted are scrutinized.7 Fi-
nally, in Part III the Essay evaluates climate engineering as a failure of 
multilateral governance and makes a number of suggestions for re-
form.8 
and self-evident to oth-
lessening heat absorption by land and water 
d 
                                                       
I. Geoengineering Proposals 
 “Geoengineering” refers to large-scale techniques directed at miti-
gating the environmental harm caused by human beings.9 In the con-
text of climate change, geoengineering proposals often aim to mini-
mize or offset the heating effects of GHGs.10 Although pursuing the 
same goal, geoengineering as a strategy is distinct from the public pol-
icy of reducing emissions of GHGs to combat global heating trends.11 
Geoengineering proposals to combat global climate change vary widely, 
and run the gamut from those that are modest 
ers that are esoteric and marginally plausible.12 
 Most serious proposals can be separated into two groups, based on 
their objectives: (1) removing carbon dioxide (“CO ”) from the atmos-
phere; and (2) reducing the amount of solar radiation reaching the 
planet’s surface, thereby 
2
an in the atmosphere.13 
 Either of these strategies, if implemented safely and effectively, 
could slow or even stop the warming of the planet caused by the green-
house effect.14 While some approaches might be effective, unintended 
                                                               
 (Oct. 29, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 COP], avail-
able 
ring, 409 Nature 420, 420 (2001).  
bert C. Lin, Geoengineering Governance, 8 Issues in Legal Scholarship 1, 2 
(200
tes 16–60 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 9–60 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 61–77 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 78–130 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 131–170 and accompanying text. 
9 See United Nations Environment Programme, Oct. 18–19, 2010, Biodiversity and Climate 
Change, 5, n.3, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33
at https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec-33-en.pdf; David W. Keith, 
Geoenginee
10 See Al
9). 
11 Id. 
12 See infra notes 16–60 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra no
14 See Sci. & Tech. Committee, Regulation of Geoengineering, 2009–10, H.C. 221, 
at 11–14 (U.K.). 
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consequences may be difficult to predict.15 Several of the geoengineer-
ing proposals currently receiving some level of serious consideration are 
set out below, comprising a compendium that is intended to be illustra-
tive rather than comprehensive. 
blem from an engineering per-
                                                                                                                     
A. Carbon Dioxide Removal 
 In 2010, CO2 accounted for approximately 84% of the GHGs emit-
ted by human activity in the United States.16 Consequently, reducing 
CO2 concentration in the atmosphere could address a major contribu-
tor to global warming. In the United States, electricity generation con-
tributes 40% of CO2 emissions and industry accounts for 14%.17 Al-
though the concentration of CO2 in the ambient atmosphere is only 
about 0.04%, the pollutant is many times more concentrated in power 
plant flue gases, in the neighborhood of 3 to 5%.18 By contrast the 
sources of methane (natural gas, CH4), another significant GHG, are 
more diffuse, including agriculture and forestry.19 Accordingly, most of 
the attention to the global warming pro
spective has focused on CO2 removal.20 
 One method of CO  removal from the atmosphere involves captur-
ing emissions from waste gases with relatively high concentrations of 
CO  emitted by discrete point sources. Such sources include power 
plants and large manufacturing facilities; from their gaseous effluent 
streams, CO  could be captured, compressed, and injected into geologi-
cal reservoirs, for instance on the ocean floor.
2
2
2
21 This process, generally 
referred to as carbon capture and storage (“CCS”), would allow for the 
 
15 John Virgoe, International Governance of a Possible Geoengineering Intervention to Combat 
Clim
:// 
www ov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html (last visited May 14, 2013). 
 Capture of Carbon Dioxide from Ambient Air, 176 Eur. Phys. J. Special 
Top
 et al., Mitigating Agricultural Emissions of Methane, 40 Climatic Change 
39, 
so far focus on CO2 which is long-lived, and present at a rela-
tive
ould be characterized as ge-
oen  or simply an emissions reduction technique. Id. 
ate Change, 95 Climatic Change 103, 107 (2009). 
16 Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http
.epa.g
17 Id. 
18 See K.S. Lackner,
ics 93, 94 (2009). 
19 A.R. Mosier
39–40 (1998). 
20 See The Royal Soc’y, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and 
Uncertainty 1 (2009), available at http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_ 
Content/policy/publications/2009/8693.pdf (noting that “most if not all of the [geoengi-
neering] methods proposed 
ly high concentration”). 
21 Keith, supra note 9. Because this approach limits emissions, but does not remove ex-
isting CO2 from the atmosphere, it is debatable whether it sh
gineering
2013] Geoengineering & Intrenational Governance 417 
co ersion of fossil fuels to clean energy products, such as electricity, 
while considerably reducing or eliminating atmospheric emissions.
nv
ite the risk, several CCS initiatives 
ave
turing carbon from the ambient atmosphere. As a 
group, these are generally referred to as carbon dioxide removal 
 organisms die, they, along with the carbon they 
                                                                                                                     
22 
 For CCS to be effective, CO  would need to be sequestered on a 
very large scale, and the attendant risks are potentially severe.
2
23 Leak-
age of sequestered CO  could cause harm to local wildlife, and in ex-
treme cases, human death.
2
24 Desp
h  already been undertaken on the national level, including projects 
in the United States and Canada.25 
 As described in the following sections, there have also been pro-
posals for geoengineering interventions to address the even more chal-
lenging task of cap
(“CDR”) schemes.  
1. Ocean Fertilization 
 One of the most widely discussed geoengineering proposals to off-
set climate change is ocean fertilization.26 Although it is technically an-
other form of CO2 removal, ocean fertilization takes a qualitatively dif-
ferent form from the CCS method described above.27 The process con-
sists of adding large deposits of nutrients to the ocean in order to spur 
the growth of marine algae and phytoplankton.28 The increased num-
bers of these photosynthesizing organisms would be expected to en-
hance CO2 uptake from the upper ocean and atmosphere.29 Ulti-
mately, as the marine
 
ith injected CO2 potentially 
spre f square miles for a single project . . . .”). 
Engineer the Climate?, 33 Climatic Change 309, 
314
ton, A Review of Climate Geoengineering Proposals, 
109 
No. 11-47, 2011) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ 
bod
22 See id. 
23 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration: As-
sessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 Emory L.J. 103, 107 
(2008) (“For CCS to have a real impact on climate change, projects must sequester mil-
lions of tons of CO2 per year at each individual storage site, w
ading over tens o
24 See id. at 118. 
25 Klass & Wilson, supra note 24, at 117. 
26 See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, May We 
 (1996); Virgoe, supra note 15, at 108. 
27 Naomi E. Vaughan & Timothy M. Len
Climatic Change 745, 754–55 (2011). 
28 See James Edward Peterson, Can Algae Save Civilization?: A Look at Technology, Law, and 
Policy Regarding Iron Fertilization of the Ocean to Counteract the Greenhouse Effect, 6 Colo. J. 
Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 61, 63–64 (1995); Vaughan & Lenton, supra note 27; Daniel Bo-
dansky, Governing Climate Engineering: Scenarios for Analysis 10 (Harv. Project on Climate 
Agreements, Discussion Paper 
ansky-dp-47-nov-final.pdf. 
29 Lin, supra note 10, at 6. 
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ab rbed from the atmosphere, would sink to the ocean floor in what is 
called a “biological pump.”
so
ple, boosting 
carbon uptake by microorganisms could deplete the ocean’s oxygen 
ffects on marine ecosystems.35  
 the 
fertility of the affected soil, and depending on the scale of such a pro-
ject, have detrimenta astal areas.39  
ate global warming by reducing the amount of sunlight that reaches 
                                                                                                                     
30 
 Iron, which scientists believe is the limiting factor of phytoplank-
ton growth in its natural environment, would most likely be the nutri-
ent of choice for ocean fertilization.31 Therefore, in practice, ocean 
fertilization would likely involve dumping a large quantity of iron filings 
into the ocean.32 This approach is relatively untested. Preliminary ex-
perimentation revealed uncertainties regarding the optimal ocean fer-
tilization method and questioned its ultimate effectiveness.33 Potential 
negative consequences are also unpredictable.34 For exam
supply and have harmful e
2. Enhanced Weathering 
 Enhanced weathering is another technique artificially to enhance 
natural CO2 removal.36 This process would involve adding minerals or 
chemicals to agricultural soils to accelerate the natural reaction of sili-
cate rocks with CO2, thus removing more CO2 from the atmosphere.37 
The enhanced weathering approach would have considerable costs due 
to the quantity of minerals it would require.38 It could also harm
l effects on nearby rivers and co
B. Solar Radiation Management 
 A large number of techniques have also been proposed to attenu-
 
tion, namely excess algal growth 
that
g is estimated to be feasible and incur relatively mod-
erat
2. 
c’y, supra note 20, at 12–14. 
30 The Royal Soc’y, supra note 20, at 75. 
31 Keith, supra note 9. Iron has been shown to yield a higher rate of carbon uptake 
than other nutrients. Id. Recently, however, nitrogen and phosphates have been suggested 
as more effective nutrients for ocean fertilization. Vaughan & Lenton, supra note 27, at 
755. Excess amounts of nitrogen and phosphates in freshwater settings cause pollution for 
the same reason they could be useful for ocean fertiliza
 can lead to eutrophication of waterways. Id. 755–57. 
32 See Keith, supra note 9; Vaughan & Lenton, supra note 27, at 755. Based on the glob-
al supply of iron, such an undertakin
e costs. Lin, supra note 10, at 6. 
33 Lin, supra note 10, at 6–7. 
34 Keith, supra note 9; Lin, supra note 10, at 7. 
35 Keith, supra note 9; Lin, supra note 10, at 7. 
36 See Sci. & Tech. Committee, supra note 14, at 1
37 The Royal So
38 Id. at 13–14. 
39 Id. at 14. 
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the Earth’s surface.40 Some proposals in this category are as simple as 
painting roofs white instead of darker colors.41 Another proposal that 
has attracted serious consideration involves injecting sulfates and other 
foreign matter into the stratosphere.42 Natural processes would be ex-
pected to transform these substances into aerosols, minuscule particles 
that remain in the stratosphere for a year or longer.43 The reflective 
property of these aerosols would keep some sunlight from reaching the 
lower layers of the atmosphere where it is absorbed as heat.44 This 
technique, which is sometimes called stratospheric scatter,45 is one of 
the more credible geoengineering proposals, but still includes a signifi-
e, would nec-
ssar
                                                                                                                     
cant risk of unwanted adverse impacts.46 
 Stratospheric scatters, while potentially slowing the Earth’s rise in 
temperature, could also harm the environment in several ways.47 First, 
the proposed aerosol injections would contain sulfur particles, which 
could convert to sulfuric acid in the upper atmosphere and return to 
Earth as acid rain.48 In addition to the terrestrial problems it can cause, 
acid rain would exacerbate the acidification of the oceans already 
caused by GHGs, likely increasing harm to the marine environment.49 
Second, there is evidence indicating that stratospheric injections of sul-
fur could damage or slow the recovery of the stratospheric ozone layer, 
which protects the Earth from ultraviolet rays.50 Finally, there are con-
cerns about the injections’ adverse effects on Asian monsoons.51 Clear-
ly, the aerosols injected into the atmosphere could be expected to drift 
beyond the jurisdiction of the state where the action occurred, and the 
consequences of stratospheric scatters, for better or wors
e ily be felt on an international and likely global scale. 
 A similar solar radiation management (“SRM”) approach would be 
to enhance the reflectivity of clouds, which already provide the Earth 
 
A. Fahrenthold, White Rooftops May Help Slow Warming, Wash. Post, June 14, 
2009
 supra note 10, at 4. 
e 15, at 108. 
supra note 10, at 5. 
heric 
Sulp e Royal Soc’y 4007, 4026−30 (2008). 
40 See Lin, supra note 10, at 3. 
41 David 
, at A3. 
42 Lin,
43 Id. 
44 See id. 
45 Keith, supra note 9. 
46 Lin, supra note 10, at 4. 
47 See id. at 4–5; Virgoe, supra not
48 Virgoe, supra note 15, at 108. 
49 See Lin, 
50 Id. 
51 See, e.g., Philip J. Rasch et al., An Overview of Geoengineering of Climate Using Stratosp
hate Aerosols, 366 Phil. Transactions of th
420 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:413 
some protection from the sun’s rays.52 This so-called “cloud whitening” 
process would involve spraying sea salt particles into the air to augment 
natural cloud formation.53 The salt particles would provide surfaces on 
which water vapor in the air would condense, resulting in whiter 
clouds.54 According to some estimates, global warming could be signifi-
cantly offset by a fleet of fifteen hundred boats equipped with cloud 
whitening spray.55 Cloud whitening presents its own potential risks on 
an international scale, however, including droughts caused by reduced 
vap
eric scatters, but would 
not be altogether free from risk.59 It would also come with a much lar-
ger pric
ted international ef-
forts in this area.61 A number of modest efforts have already been un-
der
     
e oration from the ocean and unpredictable effects on local weather 
patterns.56 
 Yet another SRM proposal would be to send reflective objects into 
outer space.57 These reflectors would orbit the Earth, blocking a small 
but significant percentage of light from the sun.58 This approach would 
avoid the atmospheric side effects of stratosph
e tag, estimated at five trillion dollars.60 
II. Existing International Governance Structures 
 Although seemingly novel from the perspective of both intent and 
design, climate engineering proposals can be at least partially charac-
terized according to well-established principles of international law. 
Several multilateral treaties cover subject matter that could be inter-
preted to address either climate management strategies or the effects of 
geoengineering interventions, leading to the inference that those 
agreements might serve as vehicles for coordina
taken to address iron fertilization proposals.62 
                                                                                                                 
52 The Royal Soc’y, supra note 20, at 27. 
en Dorell, Researchers Exploring Cloud Whitening, USA Today, June 11, 2010, at 
2A. 
te: Science, Governance and Uncertainty, supra 
not
 id. 
t Takes to Save the World?, 447 Nature 132, 135–36 
(20
 
53 Id.; Or
54 Geoengineering the Clima
e 20, at 27. 
55 See
56 See id. at 28; Dorell, supra note 53. 
57 See Lin, supra note 10, at 5–6. 
58 Oliver Morton, Is This What I
07). 
59 See, e.g., Lin, supra note 10, at 5–6 (noting that reflectors in space could interfere 
with spacecraft orbiting the Earth). 
60 Morton, supra note 58, at 136. 
61 See, e.g., 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1; United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165 [hereinafter FCCC], avail-
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A. Climate Engineering in the International Legal System 
 From a legal perspective, geoengineering proposals can be divided 
into a number of categories. First, the effects of all climate engineering 
interventions can be expected—and, indeed, are intended—to be 
global in scope. Because the principal greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) are 
“well-mixed,” meaning evenly distributed over the planet, emissions 
anywhere on Earth affect everyone, everywhere. More particularly, in-
terventions in the climate system, whether exacerbating the problem 
(as in the form of increased emissions of GHGs) or beneficial (as in the 
form of emissions reductions) affect all states,63 the principal subjects 
of international law. 
 The climate, moreover, can plausibly be characterized from a legal 
point of view as a global commons, like the high seas or Antarctica, be-
yond the reach of national jurisdiction.64 From this perspective, no one 
state would have the authority to govern in the legal space occupied by 
the climate. And, of course, no single state has the practical capacity to 
alter the climate in a manner that affects only itself. Because emissions 
of GHGs originate from all over the planet, no one state has the ability 
unilaterally to determine the concentrations of GHGs in the atmos-
phere, and hence the integrity of the global climate. Consequently, 
climate policy necessarily involves issues of commons management, at a 
magnitude and urgency rarely if ever before encountered.65 
 While all geoengineering interventions will necessarily have global 
effects, at least in theory one could divide proposals into two categories: 
those that could be expected to have only beneficial effects, and those 
that might also have adverse consequences. Proposals that fall into the 
latter category would benefit from policies that encourage or require 
investigation and identification of harmful effects that may not be ini-
                                                                                                                      
able at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf; Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques art. I, 
May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter ENMOD], available at 
ereinafter The London 
Con
olution LC-LP.1], available at 
www 101&filename=1. 
 note 26, at 309. 
ns, 162 Sci. Mag. 1243, 1244–45 (1968) 
(“Fr
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1978/10/19781005%2000-39%20AM/Ch_XXVI_01p. 
pdf; London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [h
vention], available at www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_lc.pdf.  
62 See, e.g., Int’l Maritime Org., Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008) on the Regulation of Ocean Fer-
tilization, IMO Doc. LC30/16 (Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Res
.imo.org/blast/blastData.asp?doc_id=14
63 See Bodansky, supra
64 See id. at 310, 312. 
65 See Garrett Hardin, A Tragedy of the Commo
eedom in the commons brings ruin to all.”). 
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tially apparent in advance of deploying those proposals.66 This might 
include further laboratory investigations, or perhaps limited field trials. 
In practice, however, it may be difficult or impossible to anticipate un-
intended negative consequences either qualitatively or quantitatively. 
 The structure of the international legal system suggests a second 
line of cleavage based on an attribute other than the effect of a particu-
lar intervention: whether a proposed action occurs within national ju-
risdiction. International law includes in this category actions taken 
within a state’s territorial sea and those undertaken aboard vessels fly-
ing a state’s flag outside that state’s area of exclusive jurisdiction.67 
Based on the established structure of the international legal system, this 
te
ry control only of that 
ate
                                                                                                                     
ca gory of activities could be regulated only by the state within whose 
jurisdiction the intervention takes place.68 
 For example, a carbon capture and storage initiative69 might be 
undertaken within a single state’s territory, with the byproduct perma-
nently stored in that state’s land mass or territorial sea. In such a situa-
tion, the activity concerned would fall within the sovereign jurisdiction 
of the state in which the undertaking occurs, and would be subject to 
the exercise of the police power and regulato
st , whose government by definition has a monopoly on the exercise 
of governmental authority within its territory.70 
 That said, actions taking place within a national jurisdiction may 
also be constrained by international legal obligations, such as a cus-
tomary duty to refrain from transboundary pollution, expectations of 
decision-making based on precaution,71 or obligations undertaken in 
bilateral or multilateral treaties addressing environmental pollution.72 
Additionally, it may be difficult to determine whether a particular ac-
tion—such as one undertaken in the upper atmosphere—falls within 
the acting state’s national jurisdiction. But because geoengineering ac-
tions are certain to have global effects whether or not they occur within 
 
66 See infra notes 169–170 and accompanying text. 
67 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 90–92, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A-31363-English.pdf. 
68 Id. 
69 See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text. 
70 See David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two Steps For-
ward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 599, 622 (1995) (“After all, the state’s right 
to exploit its resources . . . is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.”). 
71 See infra notes 169–170 and accompanying text. 
72 Bodansky, supra note 26, at 312; see, e.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 34 U.S.T. 3043, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217. 
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a single state’s jurisdiction, one might consider all climate engineering 
proposals to be governed by the corpus of international environmental 
w, 
 by a patchwork of 
ter
 a state’s exclusive jurisdiction, but quite obviously the 
nutrients involved would likely, if not inevitably, drift into and across 
internatio
Despite the variety of settings and policy instruments available in the 
                                                                                                                     
la a considerable portion of which addresses extraterritorial effects of 
domestic actions.73 
 A second class of actions defined by territorial location is com-
posed of interventions whose physical location lies beyond national ju-
risdiction, such as on the high seas or in outer space. In contrast to an 
activity that takes place within a state’s territory, many actions occurring 
in areas outside national jurisdiction lie beyond the reach of law, as by 
definition no state has the legal authority to regulate there.74 These 
extraterritorial actions are constrained, if at all, only
in national custom and agreements that neither encompass all trans-
boundary activity nor necessarily bind every state.75 
 Some proposals, such as the suggestion for sending orbiting reflec-
tors into space, necessarily occur beyond national jurisdiction in areas 
of the global—or, in the case of outer space, the celestial—commons.76 
In many other areas related to climate management, however, there 
may be grey or uncertain areas. For example, although a geoengineer-
ing intervention may involve delivery of a physical agent into the 
oceans on the high seas, chances are that a readily identifiable state will 
have jurisdiction over the vessel from which such an action is initi-
ated.77 Alternatively, ocean fertilization might take place in coastal wa-
ters subject to
nal waters. 
B. Multilateral Initiatives Related to Climate Engineering 
 On a truly global issue such as climate change, multilateral fora 
tend to play a predominant role. International institutions, and particu-
larly multilateral organizations, are settings in which a great deal of law 
is made and non-binding good practice standards are established.78 
 
73 See, e.g., Philippe Sands et al., Principles of International Environmental 
Law (3d ed. 2012); Alexandre Charles Kiss & Dinah Shelton, International Envi-
ronmental Law 86–88 (3d ed. 2004). 
74 See The Royal Soc’y, supra note 20, at xi, 40. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. at 32. 
77 See UNCLOS, supra note 67, arts. 90–92. 
78 David A. Wirth, The EU’s New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation, 31 Fletcher F. 
World Aff. 91, 92 (2007). 
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multilateral system to coordinate and harmonize states’ actions on the 
national and international levels, relatively little by way of concrete 
ea
 to geoengineering, chiefly ocean fertilization, are then ana-
lyzed. 
P
natural starting place for considering geoengineer-
g t
to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmos-
                                                                                                                     
m sures have been adopted with respect to climate engineering. 
 A number of existing instruments might provide legal authority 
for action on geoengineering, either by encouraging or constraining 
proposals for such interventions in the ecosystem. Several of the more 
obvious are identified below, although the list is not intended to be ex-
haustive. The small number of concrete but modest efforts actually ad-
dressed
1. otential Instruments and Settings for Addressing Geoengineering 
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“FCCC”), to which almost every United Nations (“U.N.”) Member 
State is party, establishes a global architecture for coordinating national 
and international efforts to deal with many aspects of the climate 
change problem.79 The FCCC addresses efforts that include most nota-
bly mitigation (emissions reductions) and adaptation (responses to 
climate change that has already occurred or is inevitable).80 As such, 
that agreement is a 
in echniques. 
 Although not specifically identified in the agreement,81 some ge-
oengineering proposals, most particularly carbon dioxide removal 
(“CDR”), can plausibly be considered as a component of larger mitiga-
tion strategies. The FCCC also encourages states parties to enhance 
sinks and reservoirs for carbon dioxide and other GHGs.82 Although 
the illustrative examples in the relevant provision include biomass and 
forests,83 the concept would seem equally applicable to CDR proposals. 
 Solar radiation management (“SRM”) proposals, which are less 
obviously mitigation measures because they involve neither emissions 
reductions nor sequestration in sinks, might nonetheless be covered by 
other portions of the agreement. Climate change, as specified in the 
FCCC, is “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly 
 
79 See Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, FCCC, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited May 14, 2013); see also 
FCCC, supra note 61. 
80 See Background on the UNFCCC, supra note 79. 
81 See FCCC, supra note 61. 
82 Id. art. 4, ¶ 1(d). 
83 Id. 
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phere.”84 The SRM proposals of stratospheric scatters and cloud whit-
ening appear to fall within this definition. The FCCC also identifies 
constraints on mitigation measures that might have adverse environ-
mental effects, including a requirement for prior analysis of effects in 
an environmental assessment.85 The FCCC also creates avenues 
through which states could share and assess geoengineering propos-
als.86 The treaty, however, does not establish binding law with regard to 
geoengineering.87  
 One international agreement that may have specific but limited 
application to the field of geoengineering is the U.N. Convention on 
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (“ENMOD”),88 which prohibits interventions 
in the environment such as weather modification for military or hostile 
purposes but specifically allow actions taken for “peaceful purposes.”89 
Thus, it is unclear which geoengineering proposals, if any, would fall 
under the treaty’s purview.90 The subjective criterion of intent may be 
difficult to establish with certainty and, indeed, may invite disputes. 
With only seventy-six parties, ENMOD does not enjoy the near-universal 
acceptance of the FCCC.91 ENMOD both regulates and protects states 
parties to the agreement, but it has no legal force with respect to the 
obligations or rights of the many nonparty states.92 In other words, 
ENMOD parties are only prohibited from harming one another; they 
are not barred by the agreement from taking environmental actions 
that harm nonparty states.93 
                                                                                                                      
84 Id. art. 1, ¶ 2. 
85 Id. art. 4, ¶ 1(f); see Bodansky, supra note 28, at 13−14 (noting the FCCC’s applicabil-
ity to geoengineering); infra notes 113, 121 and accompanying text (IMO resolutions and 
CBD decisions on ocean fertilization identify need for prior environmental impact assess-
ments). 
86 See FCCC, supra note 61, art. 5. 
87 See Bodansky, supra note 26, at 313; Lin, supra note 10, at 15; see also Virgoe, supra 
note 15, at 114. 
88 ENMOD, supra note 61. 
89 Id. art. III. 
90 See Bodansky, supra note 26, at 311. 
91 Compare Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (ENMOD), U.N. Office of Disarmament Affs., http://disarmament. 
un.org/treaties/t/enmod (last visited May 14, 2013) (listing seventy-six states parties to EN-
MOD), with Background on the UNFCCC, supra note 79 (listing one hundred ninety-five states 
parties to the FCCC). 
92 See Lin, supra note 10, at 20. 
93 Id. Furthermore, ENMOD contains no sanctions or enforcement mechanisms for 
parties that violate its provisions. See ENMOD, supra note 61; see also Lin, supra note 10, at 
20. 
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 Because of its focus on hostile environmental actions and its limited 
acceptance internationally, ENMOD appears to have little applicability 
to climate engineering.94 By contrast, treaties that address atmospheric 
pollution, most notably the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution (“LRTAP”),95 are more likely to be sources of 
binding norms that might govern SRM proposals with potential adverse 
environmental effects. More particularly, LRTAP’s three protocols ad-
dressing sulfur,96 intended to limit atmospheric acidification, would be 
particularly relevant to stratospheric scatters. Although covering a large 
area including North America, Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and Israel, 
LRTAP is a regional and not a universal instrument and consequently 
does not articulate globally applicable standards.97 As in the case of 
ENMOD, the agreement and its protocols—which contain the bulk of 
the regime’s substantive regulatory measures—bind only those states 
parties to them. Although the United States is a party to the Conven-
tion, it has not accepted two of the important protocols on sulfur. 
 Another treaty with potential implications for geoengineering is 
the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).98 UN-
CLOS sets out obligations for the use of marine natural resources lo-
cated outside states’ coastal jurisdiction, and confirms every state’s right 
to use international waters for peaceful purposes.99 Part XII of the 
agreement specifically addresses protection of the marine environ-
ment, and thus could potentially apply to ocean fertilization propos-
als.100 UNCLOS requires measures to prevent marine pollution in areas 
and for actions that fall under national jurisdiction,101 but specifically 
                                                                                                                      
94 See Bodansky, supra note 26, at 311. 
95 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, supra note 72. 
96 1999 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone, U.N. Doc. EB.AIR/1999/ 
1 (Nov. 30, 1999), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20 
text/1999%20Multi.E.Amended.2005.pdf; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reductions of Sulfur Emissions, June 14, 
1994, 2030 U.N.T.S. 122, available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/ 
full%20text/1994.Sulphur.e.pdf; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution on Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by 
at Least Thirty Per Cent (Helsinki Protocol), July 8, 1985, 1480 U.N.T.S. 215, available at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1985. Sulphur.e.pdf; Con-
vention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, supra note 72. 
97 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, United Nations Econ. Comm’n 
for Eur. (May 24, 2012), http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/status/lrtap_st.html. 
98 UNCLOS, supra note 67. 
99 See id. arts. 11, 88, 145; Bodansky, supra note 26, at 314. 
100 See UNCLOS, supra note 67, pt. XII. 
101 Id. art. 194. 
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allows scientific research on the high seas, leaving open the possibility 
of geoengineering experiments in international waters.102  
2. Multilateral Responses to Date 
 The international community has so far addressed only one form 
of geoengineering in detail: ocean fertilization.103 That has occurred in 
only two fora, and the resulting instruments are non-binding exhorta-
tions and good practice standards.104 
a. London Convention and Protocol 
 The 1972 London Convention (the “London Convention”) and 
1996 London Protocol (the “Protocol”), adopted under the auspices of 
the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”), are intended to pre-
vent dumping of wastes and other harmful substances at sea.105 Adopt-
ing a precautionary approach designed to anticipate and prevent un-
certain harms, parties to the Protocol are required to prohibit all po-
tentially hazardous dumping at sea, but are allowed to grant dumping 
permits for certain less hazardous wastes.106 
 The parties to the London Convention and Protocol addressed 
ocean fertilization in a 2008 resolution.107 Defining ocean fertilization 
as “any activity undertaken by humans with the principal intention of 
stimulating primary productivity in the oceans,” the activity falls within 
the scope of the Protocol and therefore is presumptively prohibited.108 
However, the resolution also anticipates the possibility of “legitimate 
scientific research,” which should be “assessed on a case-by-case basis 
using an assessment framework to be developed” by scientific bodies 
operating under the auspices of the Convention.109 The non-binding 
resolution further anticipates the development of “specific guidance” 
for evaluating ocean fertilization proposals, and exhorts parties to the 
                                                                                                                      
102 See id. arts. 194, 256–57; Bodansky, supra note 26 (suggesting that “so long as ocean 
fertilization were done more than 200 miles from shore, it would arguably be permissible 
under [UNCLOS]”). 
103 See infra notes 26–35 and accompanying text. 
104 See supra notes 105–130 and accompanying text. 
105 The London Convention, supra note 61; 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 and Resolu-
tions Adopted by the Special Meeting, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 7 (1997) [hereinafter Lon-
don Protocol]. 
106 London Protocol, supra note 105, arts. 3–4. 
107 Resolution LC-LP.1, supra note 62, ¶ 2. 
108 Id. ¶¶ 2, 8. 
109 Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
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London Convention and Protocol in the meantime to “use utmost cau-
tion” in evaluating individual research proposals.110 
 A second resolution on the assessment framework for scientific re-
search on ocean fertilization, adopted in 2010, elaborates on the earlier 
instrument.111 The 2010 resolution contains an annex “designed for 
Contracting Parties [to the London Convention and Protocol] to evalu-
ate proposed activities that fall within the scope of” the earlier resolu-
tion.112 Among the components of the analysis is environmental assess-
ment—a well-recognized tool for evaluating the anticipated environ-
mental effects of a proposed action before it is undertaken113—with 
particular attention to ocean fertilization.114 Neither resolution antici-
pates approval of any proposals by a multilateral body.115 Instead, pursu-
ant to the London Convention and Protocol, authorization to engage in 
scientific research on ocean fertilization—which translates legally into 
permission to engage in otherwise prohibited dumping—is granted by 
national authorities, presumably in a manner consistent with the multi-
laterally-agreed guidance contained in the 2010 resolution.116 
b. Convention on Biological Diversity 
 In addition to the resolutions adopted under the London Conven-
tion and Protocol, the 193 parties to the Convention on Biological Di-
versity (“CBD”) also took up the question of ocean fertilization at much 
the same time.117 Rather than protecting the marine environment from 
dumping, which is the functional purpose of the London Convention 
                                                                                                                      
110 Id. ¶ 6. 
111 IMO, Resolution LC-LP.2 (2008) on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involv-
ing Ocean Fertilization, IMO Doc. LC32/15 (Oct. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Resolution LC-LP.2], 
available at http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=31100&filename=2010 
resolutiononAFOF.pdf. 
112 Id. annex 6, ¶ 1.1. 
113 See, e.g., David A. Wirth, International Technology Transfer and Environmental Impact As-
sessment, in Transferring Hazardous Technologies and Substances: The Interna-
tional Legal Challenge 83 (Günther Handl & Robert E. Lutz eds., 1989). 
114 Resolution LC-LP.2, supra note 111, annex 6, ¶ 1.1. 
115 See Resolution LC-LP.1, supra note 62, ¶ 6 (urging only that parties “use utmost cau-
tion and the best available guidance” when evaluating research proposals). See generally 
Resolution LC-LP.2, supra note 111 (providing contracting parties with a guide for assessing 
proposed ocean fertilization projects). 
116 See Resolution LC-LP.2, supra note 111, ¶¶ 5–7, nn.1–2. 
117 2010 COP, supra note 9; United Nations Environment Programme, May 19–20, 
2008, Biodiversity and Climate Change, pt. C, UNEP/COP/DEC/IX/16 (Oct. 9, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter 2008 COP], available at https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-09/cop-09-dec-16-en.pdf; 
List of Parties, Convention on Biological Diversity, https://www.cbd.int/inform- 
ation/ parties.shtml (last visited May 23, 2013). 
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resolutions, the motivation for the CBD is the preservation of biological 
diversity.118 
 In a decision adopted at its 2008 meeting—which, like the London 
Convention resolutions is not legally binding—the Conference of the 
Parties to the CBD dealt expressly with ocean fertilization.119 While not-
ing the earlier resolution under the London Convention and Protocol 
and “urg[ing] Parties and other [non-party] Governments to act in ac-
cordance with [it],”120 the decision made specific recommendations: 
[The Conference of the Parties] requests Parties and urges oth-
er Governments, in accordance with the precautionary ap-
proach, to ensure that ocean fertilization activities do not take 
place until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to 
justify such activities, including assessing associated risks, and 
a global, transparent and effective control and regulatory 
mechanism is in place for these activities; with the exception 
of small scale scientific research studies within coastal waters. 
Such studies should only be authorized if justified by the need 
to gather specific scientific data, and should also be subject to 
a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts of the 
research studies on the marine environment, and be strictly 
controlled, and not be used for generating and selling carbon 
offsets or any other commercial purposes.121 
 The 2008 CBD decision diverges from its London Convention 
counterpart in a number of important respects. First, the CBD decision 
invokes the precautionary principle. Notably, the CBD decision antici-
pates a global—and presumably multilaterally-administered—mechanism 
as a condition precedent for approval of those ocean fertilization activi-
ties that go forward.122 The transparency requirement apparently an-
ticipates public notification of proposals and an opportunity for citizen 
input.123 Inclusion of the word “regulatory” is significant, as this term is 
infrequently used in international instruments because it may be inter-
preted as encroaching upon states’ sovereign prerogatives.124 
                                                                                                                      
118 2008 COP, supra note 117, pt. A, ¶ 1. 
119 Id. pt. C. 
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124 See 2008 COP, supra note 117, pt. C, ¶ 4. 
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 In addition to expressly invoking a precautionary perspective, the 
2008 CBD decision also anticipates a stricter standard for approval of 
scientific research projects.125 Among other things, the decision con-
fines scientific research to coastal waters, presumably within a state’s 
exclusive jurisdiction, and not in areas of the global commons such as 
the high seas—a restriction not found in the IMO scheme.126 
 The Conference of the Parties to the CBD revisited the issue of 
ocean fertilization at its next meeting in 2010, expanding its earlier de-
cision with some important additions.127 Most importantly, the revision 
significantly expanded the coverage of the earlier decision to include 
not only ocean fertilization, but also “any technologies that deliberately 
reduce solar insolation [solar radiation received at the earth’s surface] 
or increase carbon sequestration from the atmosphere on a large scale 
that may affect biodiversity (excluding carbon capture and storage 
from fossil fuels when it captures carbon dioxide before it is released 
into the atmosphere).”128 
 Structured as a blanket ban with limited exceptions authorized 
through a multilateral prior approval scheme, the CBD decision is in-
tended to apply to virtually all ecosystem interventions that might plau-
sibly be considered geoengineering.129 Restricted interventions might 
include both CDR and SRM schemes. The second CBD decision also 
expanded the impacts requiring prior assessment from effects on bio-
diversity and the environment to include “associated social, economic 
and cultural impacts.”130 
III. Climate Engineering as Multilateral Failure 
 New challenges like climate engineering proposals tend to throw 
multilateral institutional failures into sharp relief. The limited and tep-
id response to the challenge of setting normative standards for geoen-
gineering pointedly spotlights the inadequacy of the existing architec-
ture for international governance. Of the numerous international insti-
                                                                                                                      
125 Id. 
126 Id. pt. A, ¶ 3, pt. C, ¶ 4. 
127 2010 COP, supra note 9. 
128 Id. ¶ 8(w) n.3. The decision also “noted that solar insolation is defined as a meas-
ure of solar radiation energy received on a given surface area in a given hour and that 
carbon sequestration is defined as the process of increasing the carbon content of a reser-
voir/pool other than the atmosphere.” Id. 
129 See id. 
130 Id. ¶ 8(w). Unlike the previous CBD decision and the two IMO resolutions, the 
2010 CBD decision does not specifically address scientific research in coastal waters. See id. 
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tutions that could effectively contribute to addressing the benefits and 
risks from climate engineering, only two have even begun to grapple 
with those demands, and only then in the form of non-binding, poten-
tially contradictory instruments.131 
 More than one thousand multilateral agreements address envi-
ronmental concerns.132 For better or worse, multilateral environmental 
management has become increasingly compartmentalized and frag-
mented.133 The United Nations Environment Program (“UNEP”) is the 
only international institution whose mission is exclusively environ-
mental.134 Numerous other international organizations have within 
their broader purview some role in addressing global environmental 
challenges.135 For example, the 1972 London Convention and 1996 
London Protocol, and other marine pollution agreements, have been 
negotiated under the auspices of the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (“IMO”).136 Additionally, the United Nations (“U.N.”) Economic 
Commission for Europe has overseen a number of important regional 
negotiations regarding traditional air pollution questions;137 the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development has provided 
an important forum for addressing transboundary pollution; and the 
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization has played a significant role in 
creating international policy on pesticides.138 
 These legal and institutional settings are not only different in kind 
from those encountered in municipal law; international public policy 
interventions diverge significantly from the regulatory mechanisms 
normally available to national governments.139 Coordinated multilat-
eral initiatives often take the form of binding international agreements, 
but also include non-binding, hortatory resolutions unlike the regula-
tory tools typically encountered at the national level.140 Further com-
plicating the analysis, supranational authorities like the European Un-
                                                                                                                      
131 See supra notes 105–130 and accompanying text. 
132 See Ronald B. Mitchell, International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database Project, 
Univ. Or., http://iea.uoregon.edu/ (last visited May 15, 2013). 
133 David A. Wirth, Globalizing the Environment, 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 
353, 368 (1998). 
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136 Id.; see The London Convention, supra note 61. 
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139 David A. Wirth, Hazardous Substances and Activities, in Oxford Handbook of In-
ternational Environmental Law 394, 397 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunée & Ellen Hey 
eds., 2007). 
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ion possess some, but not all, of the regulatory powers ordinarily re-
served to sovereign states.141 Finally, private voluntary standards as a 
means for industry self-regulation have attracted increasing attention as 
a public policy strategy in recent years.142 
                                                                                                                     
 Although much standard-setting and lawmaking occurs under the 
auspices of international organizations, many subject-matter specific 
regimes, typically constituted by multilateral agreements now frequently 
known as “framework conventions,” are free-standing functional bodies, 
typically with their own professional secretariats.143 To further compli-
cate the situation, many of these formally autonomous regimes are the 
products of initiatives of existing organizations and frequently retain 
both formal and informal ties with them.144 This is particularly so with 
respect to agreements intended to be global or universal in scope. 
 For example, the initial multilateral response to concerns about the 
integrity of the global climate in the late 1980s took the form of creating 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a U.N.-sponsored 
body which was, and continues to be, a joint undertaking of the World 
Meteorological Organization, a U.N. specialized agency, and UNEP.145 
Another entity, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, was giv-
en responsibility for the subsequent negotiation of the U.N.-sponsored 
multilateral climate change convention.146 The resulting U.N. Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change was one of the principal outputs 
from the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development, the so-
called “Earth Summit,” also a U.N. undertaking.147 Notably, the Conven-
 
141 Id. 
142 Id. Alternatively, scholars have recognized the potential for wealthy individual ac-
tors to undertake geoengineering projects on their own initiative. David G. Victor et al., 
The Geoengineering Option: A Last Resort Against Global Warming?, 88 Foreign Aff., Mar.–Apr. 
2009, at 64, 72 (“Although it may sound like the stuff of a future James Bond movie, pri-
vate-sector geoengineers might very well attempt to deploy affordable geoengineering 
schemes on their own.”). The task of government regulators would then include the added 
role of keeping such “freelancers” in check. See id. 
143 See Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Mul-
tilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 623, 623 (2000) (describing “a common pattern of institutional arrangements” in 
the international environmental field). 
144 See generally id. (describing the structure and functions of various bodies created 
pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements). 
145 History, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
organization/organization_history.shtml (last visited May 15, 2013). 
146 Wirth, supra note 133. 
147 Background on the UNFCCC, supra note 79. 
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tion on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) was also opened for signature at 
the same conference.148 
 Any or all of these settings—existing international organizations or 
free-standing functional regimes—could potentially serve as venues for 
effectively addressing geoengineering proposals in a coordinated, har-
monized manner at the international level. Similarly, the variety of 
available policy instruments is expansive, ranging from precatory ex-
hortations of concern to non-binding codified good practice standards 
and even binding prohibitions or bans. 
 Despite the number and variety of agreements and institutional 
settings concerned with the environment, the international regime still 
evinces serious deficiencies and gaps. In everyday practice, these lacu-
nae translate into structural impediments to much-needed policies in 
response to emerging issues like climate engineering. Furthermore, the 
international community’s fragmented approach to environmental 
governance parcels out jurisdiction over different functional problems 
in sometimes piecemeal fashion.149 The authority to address issues such 
as acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion, and climate change is di-
vided by numerous agreements into an assortment of organizations and 
regimes, resulting in uneven and incomplete coverage.150 For instance, 
the United States is not party to the CBD,151 one of the few interna-
tional settings in which the challenge of climate engineering has been 
taken up with any sense of purpose. The United States is also not party 
to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).152 Even if 
these treaties were to bind every state, the professional secretariats ser-
vicing these agreements would still be scattered literally across the 
globe, yet another impediment to effective action.153 
 The resulting governance structure lacks focus and coherence, 
encumbering international cooperation, which is quite disturbing giv-
en the scale and urgency of the threat of climate change. The situation 
is exacerbated by the lack of effective decision-making procedures as an 
alternative to the sometimes crippling need for consensus, and the 
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150 See Douglas J. Caldwell & David A. Wirth, Trade and the Environment: Equilibrium or 
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151 See List of Parties, supra note 117. 
152 Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the 
Related Agreements as at 23 January 2013, United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ 
reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (last updated Jan. 23, 2013). 
153 See Caldwell & Wirth, supra note 150, at 577. 
434 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:413 
near absence of effective mechanisms for implementation.154 Inspired 
by the greater internal consistency of the system of free trade agree-
ments and the more centralized institutional precedent of the World 
Trade Organization, several influential observers have proposed the 
creation of a new international organization with greater powers in the 
environmental field.155 But, so far, such innovative suggestions have not 
been transformed into reality.156 
 Past systematic attempts at genuine multilateral management of 
the global commons are not encouraging. One example of such an ef-
fort is Part XI of UNCLOS, addressing deep sea mining on the high 
seas.157 This portion of the agreement establishes an International Sea-
bed Authority to authorize individual proposals for seabed exploration 
and mining as well as to collect and distribute a portion of the proceeds 
from those undertakings.158  
 The International Seabed Authority is now functioning and opera-
tional,159 but it can hardly be considered a success. As has been well 
documented elsewhere, the United States declined to sign UNCLOS 
because of the provisions of Part XI, and actively encouraged its allies 
to oppose the agreement.160 Although UNCLOS has enjoyed strong 
support from many lawmakers, industry leaders, and high-ranking offi-
cials, the U.S. Senate has never voted on the agreement.161 This resis-
tance persists even after the parties to UNCLOS renegotiated and re-
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wrote the controversial Part XI in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to 
secure U.S. participation.162 
 In the process, the term “common heritage of mankind” —code for 
collective multilateral management and benefits from resources of the 
global commons—has been firmly associated with objections to the New 
International Economic Order dating from the late 1970s, and has be-
come something of a third rail in international practice.163 Presumably 
for this reason, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“FCCC”) refers instead to the climate as a “common concern of hu-
mankind.”164 The FCCC’s wordsmithing could be regarded as an at-
tempt to distance itself from the acrimonious debates that still surround 
Part XI of UNCLOS.165 
 The situation is not entirely bleak, as indicated by the content of 
the two IMO resolutions166 and, especially, the two CBD decisions.167 
Environmental impact assessments, called for by both sets of instru-
ments, are at least a first line of defense in avoiding unintended envi-
ronmental harm from geoengineering proposals. Unfortunately, no 
environmental impact assessment can provide an all-purpose inocula-
tion against the possibility of unanticipated adverse consequences, as by 
definition no one can predict the unpredictable. The field of climate 
science, and global climate policy in particular, remains notoriously rife 
with uncertainty. 
 Similarly, a precautionary approach, explicitly referenced by the 
CBD decisions,168 counsels a policy bias in favor of anticipating and 
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Johnson on Oct. 5, 1976 at The University of Chicago). See generally G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), 
U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974), available at http://www. 
cetim.ch/en/documents/ag-resolution-3201-ang.pdf (declaring the establishment of a new 
international economic order). 
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preventing potential harm in the face of scientific uncertainty, particu-
larly appropriate when applied to climate engineering.169 While initially 
grounded in such everyday heuristics as “a stitch in time saves nine” 
and “look before you leap,” precaution has enjoyed increasingly wide 
acceptance as a public policy.170 But such a broad principle can hardly 
be expected to bear the weight of preventing all unanticipated effects 
from interventions in the ecosystem—especially considering how mas-
sive and unpredictable in outcome some of the more outlandish ge-
oengineering proposals appear. 
Conclusion 
 In 2012, the amount of sea ice covering the Arctic Ocean reached 
a record low,171 and to an extent greater than predicted by the com-
puter models used by scientists to forecast effects of climate change.172 
The diminution in ice cover, widely regarded as correlated with the 
heating of the Earth’s climate, is predicted further to accelerate the 
warming trend.173 Reflective white ice is replaced by dark ocean water 
with a greater rate of solar radiation absorbance—an example of a 
“positive feedback,” in which the effects of climate change further ex-
acerbate the warming phenomenon, potentially with irreversible effects 
or in a highly discontinuous manner.174 
 A quarter century ago, scientists rang alarm bells, warning of po-
tentially catastrophic consequences of human-induced climate disrup-
                                                                                                                      
169 See, e.g., David A. Wirth, Precaution in International Environmental Policy and United 
States Law and Practice, 10 N. Am. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 219, 237 (2002) (monograph pub-
lished by North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation). 
170 See id. at 237, 242. 
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tion.175 What were then prognostications are now a consistent compo-
nent of routine news reports, each more disturbing than the last. Be-
cause of the enormous uncertainties associated with the ongoing an-
thropogenic alteration of our global climate, even more dramatic, non-
linear, knife-edge, and potentially irreversible effects may yet be in 
store.176 
 If there is a positive message to take from these developments, it 
may be that the need to respond to the risks and realities of climate 
disruption is urgent. Public appreciation of how close we may be to a 
tipping point might well catalyze policy demand for creative solu-
tions.177 Lawmakers, both domestic and international, would be remiss 
not to seriously consider geoengineering proposals to mitigate the 
harm of global warming. Geoengineering techniques—especially those 
directed toward increasing the reflectivity of the Earth with a low likeli-
hood of unanticipated adverse effects—could be at the very least viable 
short-term options to supplement traditional emissions reduction ap-
proaches, whose progress is slow. 
 But there are risks, perhaps unanticipated ones, as well. Currently, 
there are few international constraints to prevent states from unilater-
ally undertaking geoengineering projects that could, for better or 
worse, affect the entire planet. The global nature of the potential harm 
requires meaningful oversight by international institutions. Only a 
strong international legal framework can assure that geoengineering 
interventions are safe, effective, and fully disclosed and debated before 
deployment. As counseled by a precautionary perspective, we need to 
anticipate and prevent harms, including those that may result from 
otherwise well-intentioned interventions. The time to put an effective 
structural, institutional, and normative architecture in place to address 
geoengineering is now. 
 
175 Philip Shabecoff, The Heat Is On: Calculating the Consequences of a Warmer Planet Earth, 
N.Y. Times, June 26, 1988, at E1. 
176 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1191. 
177 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (ac-
knowledging that “[g]lobal warming may be a “crisis,” even “the most pressing environ-
mental problem of our time”). 
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